海湾冲突、黄金，以及全球秩序的分裂

文章时间：17 March 2026

文章观点提取：

  1. 海湾冲突仍然难以预测，冲突更可能演变为“可控的消耗战”，美国将会给自己找台阶下。

  2. 世界将继续走向竞争多极化，国家的资源、技术、供应链将变得更加举足轻重。

  3. 美元长期“边际走弱”，但在危机阶段反而会阶段性走强，但短期仍占主导地位。

  4. 美国在中东的保护伞模式产生裂痕

    1. 过去几十年，中东形成了一种默契：海湾国家依赖美国的军事保护，而作为回报，石油用美元定价，美国也在当地保持军事存在。这种“美国提供安全、换取美元石油体系”的安排正在出现问题：美国在防御导弹和无人机威胁方面效果有限，而且也无法完全掌控霍尔木兹海峡这一关键通道。
    2. 伊朗正在尝试用“能源控制权”撬动美元体系（例如：要求人民币结算石油，美国、以色列邮轮禁止通行），推动一个更分裂的全球经济结构。

  5. 为何黄金不涨反跌？美元不跌反涨？

    前提条件：市场认为这不是系统性危机

    1. 市场紧张时，优先争夺“美元流动性”，而不是配置“黄金避险”。

      1. 美元上涨不是因为“美国更好”，而是因为“美元是全球必须用的现金”：

        很多债务、保证金、跨境结算以美元结算，市场紧张需要提前买美元。

    2. 美联储加息预期上升->压制黄金、支撑美元

    3. “拥挤交易”被反向平仓

      1. 大家都在 做多黄金、做空美元，在市场紧张时，优先获利出逃、去杠杆，导致黄金下跌、美元上涨。

  6. 本次冲突如果是短期：

    • 💵 美元：短期强 → 回落
    • 🪙 黄金：后面会上涨
    • 📈 股市：修复
    • 很快就会回到正轨

    如果是中等（布油价格长期维持在$100附近）：

    • 💵 美元：偏强
    • 🪙 黄金：震荡
    • 📉 股市：承压

    如果是极端（布油价格达到$150）：

    • 💵 美元：很强（危机流动性）
    • 🪙 黄金：先乱 → 后大涨
    • 📉 股市：大跌

  7. 油气价格上涨，也会导致食品通胀，尤其是亚洲，比西方严重（亚洲国家的CPI结构：食品占比更高，能源占比更高）

    1. 化肥📈
    2. 食品加工📈
    3. 运输📈

    粗略总结：

    受益：能源、化肥、农业（净收益，成本涨价，但能把产品卖更贵「有定价权」）

    承压：餐饮、物流、制造、消费（成本上升，售价难以对应提高「难以成本转嫁」）

  8. 文中的一些战况消息已经过时，不再分析。

原文：

As oil breaches US$100 and gold defies expectations, the conflict is accelerating structural shifts in energy security and the US dollar’s dominance.

The situation in the Gulf remains extremely fluid. While the US administration has begun to shift its language toward “we won already”, it is difficult to imagine the Iranian regime capitulating this early. A drawn-out war of attrition is to their advantage.

But step back from the daily headlines and a broader pattern is emerging. All events continue to point toward a megatrend of global fracturing, both geopolitically and geoeconomically, and what increasingly looks like a resurgence of modern mercantilism.

The security umbrella is cracking

For decades, the implicit arrangement in the Middle East has been straightforward. The Gulf states rely on the US for military security. In return, oil is priced in US dollars and the US maintains a military presence on their territory.

That arrangement is showing cracks. The US has struggled to provide effective security against missile and drone attacks on neighbouring states and has been unable to control the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran is exploiting this. In a remarkable development, it has offered to let tanker traffic resume through the Strait, but only if oil is transacted in Chinese renminbi. The regime has also indicated it would allow ships through for all nations except the US and Israel.

The gold puzzle

In an environment like this, one would imagine gold should be rising. The opposite has happened and gold is down from pre-strike levels.

This is likely a combination of short-term factors: a knee-jerk rally in the US dollar (where nothing fundamentally would suggest the dollar should be structurally rallying right now), potential for rate hikes to offset inflation and a reversal of popular positioning. Long gold, short dollar, long oil was a crowded trade. Moments of market stress typically see profitable positions being unwound first.

This means very little to our long-term thesis. While short-term flows can drive more volatility, the structural case for gold is only strengthened by the events of the past two weeks.

Inflation impact is regional and nuanced

Markets are selling off on fears of inflation, but we think the regional effects will be more nuanced than the headlines suggest.

The US is uniquely positioned as a net exporter of both crude and natural gas, making it a relative beneficiary. But voters will still feel the impact. Retail gasoline has already risen 70 cents from US$3 per gallon pre-strike. There are rumours of the US Treasury taking short positions in the paper crude market to moderate the spike.

US headline inflation stood at 2.4% in February, before the conflict began. The key question for the impact on inflation is the duration of the shock.

The global economy has handled US$100 oil before. What makes this episode different is the pace of the rally and the disruption to logistical chains. A gradual rise to these levels would have been far more manageable. It is the speed of the spike, combined with the physical blockage of trade routes, that is causing the stress.

We are now in week three of what the US administration initially described as a four-to-six-week operation, though that timeline continues to shift. If this lasts weeks rather than months, the inflationary impact could prove more manageable.

But if the price of oil continues to hover around US$100 a barrel over the next 12 months, there’s a consensus expecting US headline inflation to rise to 3-3.5% (reflecting US$5 gasoline) and a slowdown in the global economy. If there’s a sustained rise to US$150, expectations are for 4.5-5.5% inflation (US$6+ gasoline), at which point recession fears become very real.

Food inflation

For net importers in Asia and Europe, the situation is far more acute. More than 80% of the crude and LNG flowing out of the Strait goes to Asia.

One area that deserves close attention is agriculture and food. Energy costs are highly correlated with food prices across the entire supply chain, from fertiliser production to processing and transport. In many Asian countries, energy and food make up a much larger portion of CPI baskets than in the West. The knock-on effects here could be significant if the conflict is drawn out.

It is also worth watching whether Iran will start allowing some tanker volumes out selectively to further isolate the US and Israel.

Physical damage is still limited

Given developments, one can argue that oil markets have been remarkably orderly (even if it may not have felt like it last week). This partly reflects traders’ view that this as an infrastructure disruption, rather than actual damage to production and capacity.

Figure 1. Current major Gulf infrastructure status

Source: Man Group compilation based on news sources as of 16 March 2026.

Iranian counterstrikes have mainly targeted military installations, communications and diplomatic facilities. A significant portion of the oil currently offline is simply spigots being turned off due to storage hitting capacity and a lack of takeaway routes out of the Gulf.

The weekend strike on Kharg Island targeted military installations, not oil facilities. Thus far, physical damage to energy infrastructure has been limited. Obviously, this calculus can change quickly given the unpredictability of the situation.

Parting thoughts

The conflict is changing too rapidly for analysis to keep pace. But the structural shifts underneath the daily volatility will likely outlast whatever ceasefire will eventually come.

All data sourced from Bloomberg unless otherwise stated.

Author: Al Chu, a Natural Resources Portfolio Manager at Man Group.